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ABSTRACT 
We present an online voting architecture based on partitioning the 
election in small clusters of voters and using a new Multi-party 
Computation algorithm for obtaining voting results from the 
clusters. This new algorithm has some practical advantages over 
other previously known algorithms and isn’t bound to any specific 
cryptographic concept; so it can be adapted to future 
cryptographic exigencies. Compared with other online voting 
technologies, we see that this new architecture is less vulnerable 
to hacker attacks and attacks from dishonest authorities, given that 
no sensitive information is stored in any public server and there is 
no need for any trustee to safeguard the legality of the election 
process. Even in case of an attack succeeding, the risks associated 
with the overall election are far lower than with any other voting 
system. This architecture can also be combined with any other 
voting system, inheriting advantages from both systems. 
Keywords 
Online voting; multi-party computation; cryptography. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Centralized online voting systems are commonly considered 
to be insecure. Some centralized online elections have taken place 
in which different vulnerabilities have been later detected. As 
example, Clash Vulnerability [3] was detected for the prominent 
Helios voting system [5] after it was used by Université 
Catholique de Louvain and the International Association for 
Cryptologic Research. Many experts think that we are far beyond 
the day that these technologies will be ready for massive 
deployment, if ever they are. 
An alternative method for online voting is making use of a 
distributed architecture instead of a centralized one. These 
methods have not been deployed on real use cases because of their 
practical limitations, despite being largely studied in scientific 
literature and some studies have even proven their feasibility for 
this task [1, 4, 6, 7]. Some practical limitations are related with the 
high number of messages that these methods need to exchange 
between nodes. This number usually grows exponentially with the 
number of voters. 
We propose a voting architecture based on: (i) dividing the 
election in small clusters of voters that participate in independent 
partial elections, where results are later joined to get the global 
election result; (ii) making use of a new Multi-party Computation 
(MPC) algorithm with no practical limitations for this scenario.  
2. IDEAL PROPERTIES FOR AN MPC 
VOTING ALGORITHM 
For a Multi-party Computation Voting Algorithm to be practical 
for such scenario (dividing the election in small clusters of 
voters), some properties need to be satisfied. 
Not needing trusted authorities. If there is an authority 
supervising every voting taking place, even if it’s a different 
authority for every voting, we are only dividing the problem but 
it’s still the same problem. It makes it harder for an attacker to 
have a big impact with his attack, but it also makes it a lot more 
complex to organize the voting and you are creating a lot more 
(smaller) points of failure: an attack to some of these points could 
have a small impact but still alter the outcome on tight elections. 
Hence, in an ideal scenario, there would be no authority 
supervising the cluster’s votings. The votings need to rely 
completely on the properties of the algorithm, without any 
privileged node in which other nodes need to deposit trust. This 
requisite discards some MPC algorithms based on homomorphic 
operations [2]. 
Safeguarding vote integrity. No one should be able to modify 
someone else’s vote or break the rules of the voting even without 
trustees supervising the process.  
Safeguarding vote confidentiality. If this requirement is not in 
place, it is trivial to build a voting architecture satisfying all other 
requirements. Some MPC algorithms rely on a teller node which 
receives encrypted shares from every voter node [2]. These 
systems are usually susceptible to attacks from this teller node 
consisting of: (i) taking a number n of votes and computing the 
result, (ii) adding a new vote to the same group of voters, and (iii) 
computing a new result that proves the option voted by the last 
added voter. If you repeat this process, you can find out every 
single vote processed by the teller. 
Being able to identify dishonest voters trying to alter the result 
or violate confidentiality. Any attempt to corrupt the integrity of 
an election must be detected and correctly attributed. It’s not only 
needed that the algorithm detects and avoids attempts to violate 
integrity or confidentiality of the voting, but also that it identifies 
the users who are trying to abuse. This way you can take 
disciplinary actions against these users for: (i) avoiding DoS 
attacks consisting of an infinite loop of voting cancellations, (ii) 
diminishing the incentives for attacking the election, by increasing 
the risk of punishment. Without that requirement, the system 
could be unreliable. 
Requiring a reasonable processing time and requirement of 
resources, even when dishonest voters are present. Without this 
requirement, the process would not be practical; many voters 
would reject using it because of long waiting times or it would be 
too expensive. To satisfy this requirement every step in the 
algorithm should take a small portion of time: it would be 
desirable that in no case the cluster is blocked too long waiting for 
a node to make a calculation. Some algorithms satisfy all 
conditions to be a valid algorithm for this voting architecture 
except this one. Not satisfying this condition would imply that at 
any moment a node could take a long time to make a calculation, 
only to disconnect before returning a result. It would make the 
voting to be cancelled after a long wait and no one could 
distinguish intended disconnections from casual ones. If repeated 
by a large number of users, it could block an election making it 
impossible to vote, to many (or most) users. We have to think that 
the timeout needs to enable even the participation of a node with 
low computational power and low bandwidth. 
 
3. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
We propose a new MPC algorithm that satisfies these 
requirements. It doesn’t make use of any new cryptographic 
procedure or theory; any well-known (present or future) and 
tested cryptographic procedure to establish a secure channel 
between nodes can be used. It also doesn’t depend on trust on any 
privileged node. All nodes of the cluster cooperate to calculate the 
result, making the same kind of calculations on every node.  
The algorithm is decomposed in two stages.  
3.1 Stage 1 
1. A list of virtual ballots (v-ballots) is created. Every v-
ballot has its own id. There are sc*(k+1) different v-ballots 
for every option available to vote, being sc the number of 
nodes (voters) connected to the cluster, and k a constant 
that typically will be 1. Hence, if there are 2 available 
options, with 10 voters connected, and we fix k as 1, there 
will be 20 v-ballots for option 1 and 20 v-ballots for option 
2. We can optionally add 20 v-ballots for the abstention 
option. We will call ao the total number of available 
options (including abstention). 
2. There are ao*k+1 rounds where every node extracts a v-
ballot from the list and passes the list of remaining v-
ballots to the next node. Usually there will be a pre-
established order determined before the start, and every 
node will check that the established order is not broken. 
Every node will also check that the list of remaining v-
ballots received on every round doesn’t have any 
inconsistency with previous rounds (i.e.: a v-ballot that 
wasn’t in the list in a previous round isn’t now in the list). 
If any inconsistency is detected, the voting is cancelled 
and a warning is assigned to the node reporting the 
inconsistency (as he could be lying) and to the two 
possible cheating nodes determined by another algorithm. 
For clarity and simplicity, we consider this algorithm out 
of the scope of this paper. RULE A: Every node must 
extract a v-ballot for every available option and an 
additional v-ballot for the option they want to vote for. So 
at the end of the ao*k+1 rounds, every node must have a 
v-ballot for every option plus a v-ballot for the option 
chosen. 
3. The list of the remaining v-ballots is made public by the 
last node. Every node checks that this list is consistent 
with his data. This list will be used to determine the final 
result. 
It could be that any node had cheated breaking RULE A; for 
example, selecting three v-ballots for the option they want as 
winner and none for another option. Hence, stage 2 consists of 
detecting any node which could have broken this rule. 
3.2 Stage 2 
There are some possible implementations of this stage 2. Here 
we will describe the one we usually use for our tests. 
1. Every node asks every other node (or an established high 
number of them), through a secure channel, for the id of a 
v-ballot they have selected in stage 1. The asker node 
imposes the option the returned v-ballot needs to pertain 
to. These ids, if the nodes follow the protocol, are only 
known by the nodes receiving them. Note that knowing 
only one v-ballot from every node doesn’t allow you to 
know what option he selected, as you know for sure that if 
he didn’t cheat, he selected at least one v-ballot for every 
option. 
2. For every v-ballot received, every node has to check: 
A) that the v-ballot is not one of the v-ballots in the list 
of remaining v-ballots made public after the election; 
B) that the v-ballot is not one of the v-ballots that it (the 
node asking) secretly selected in stage 1; 
C) that the v-ballot is not one of the v-ballots that other 
nodes have reported to have selected. 
3. If no collision of v-ballots is reported, the nodes agree to 
declare valid the voting and sign the result. The result is 
calculated this way: the number of votes for every option 
is n minus the number of v-ballots in the list of remaining 
v-ballots corresponding to the option.  
If a collision is reported, the nodes being in doubt, 
including the one reporting the collision, are annotated 
with a warning. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the algorithm for an over-simplified case 
(CASE 1) with 4 voters (A,B,C,D), with 2 options available to 
vote (R, N), and k=1.  
Table 1 
 Voter 
A 
Voter 
B 
Voter 
C 
Voter 
D 
Remaining  
v-ballots 
Round 
1 
N2 N1 N6 R3 N3,N4,N5,N7,N8 
R1,R2,R4,R5,R6,R7,R8 
Round 
2 
R1 R8 R4 N5 N3,N4,N7,N8 
R2,R5,R6,R7 
Round 
3 
N8 N3 R2 R7 N4,N7 
R5,R6 
 
4. RISK ANALYSIS 
We will now calculate the risks associated to the algorithm and 
compare them with the risks associated to a centralized online 
voting and a traditional paper ballot system. 
First, we will calculate the risk that a dishonest node succeeds 
with altering the voting integrity, making the rest of the nodes of 
the cluster to accept a fraudulent result. For CASE 1, there are two 
ways in that a node could try to alter the result: (i) CHEAT 1: he 
could always select a v-ballot from the same option, or (ii) 
CHEAT 2: he could modify the list of remaining v-ballots that he 
receives on any round, as if previous voters would have selected 
other ones. 
4.1 Risk of cheat 1 with a single attacker 
Hence, supposing we are in CASE 1, and node A is the one trying 
to make CHEAT 1, instead of choosing N2,R1,N8 he would 
choose for example, N2,N4,N8. So the final remaining v-ballots 
in CASE 1 would be: N7,R1,R5,R6. This result would make us 
think that 3 voters voted for N, when really only nodes A, and B 
voted for N.  
Now Node A would have to pass stage 2, where he will be asked 
one time for an N v-ballot and two times for an R v-ballot (could 
also be one R and two N but let’s suppose it this way this time). 
When he is asked for an N v-ballot he will simply return a 
randomly selected one from the three N v-ballots he selected. If 
there aren’t more nodes cheating, it will pass the test as no node 
will have the same v-ballot. When asked for an R v-ballot he 
needs to lie given that he didn’t extract any R v-ballot. If he is 
lucky, the node asking him will not discover that he is lying. If he 
is not, the node asking him will cancel the voting and initiate a 
new algorithm to detect the two nodes in conflict so that the nodes 
causing the conflict get a warning (the reporting node will also get 
a warning as he could be lying). This algorithm will not be 
explained in this paper for simplification. 
In this case (CASE 1), the probability that Node A passes the test 
having lied can be calculated. 
 
𝑝_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑝_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ_𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑟 + 𝑝_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ_𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 
 
The probability of collision detected in every single check can be 
calculated this way:  
 
If the node asking selected it, it’s 1. 
If the node that selected it also voted for this option, it’s the 
probability that he returned it when asked: ½. 
If the node that selected it didn’t select it as his vote, it’s 1, 
because it’s the only value that it can return. 
 
Hence, we can simplify it as p_collision≥0,5 and p_no_collision 
≤0,5. 
 
Given that there will be another node asking, the probability of no 
collision on first check and no collision on second check is lower 
(≤) than 0,5*0,5, so it is ≤0,25. 
 
So a dishonest node in this case would have less than a 25% 
chance of altering the result without being detected. 
A 25% chance is still too high, but we have to remember that it’s 
an over-simplified case. We can learn from this data that we 
should not make clusters with only 4 nodes. 
The general formula for the minimum probability of a node to 
cheat and not be discovered, p_cheat is: 
𝑝_𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡(𝑝_𝑛𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑎𝑜, 𝑠𝑐) =  𝑝_𝑛𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐/𝑎𝑜 
 
Table 2 shows results for different parameters. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 sc ao p_cheat 
4 2 0,25 
8 2 0,06 
15 2 0,006 
25 2 1,7E-4 
40 2 9,5E-7 
4 3 0,40 
8 3 0,15 
15 3 0,03 
25 3 0,003 
40 3 9,7E-5 
4 5 0,57 
8 5 0,33 
15 5 0,12 
25 5 0,03 
40 5 0,004 
 
So, for example, if you organize an election using this system, 
establishing 25 nodes per cluster, and having 3 available options 
to vote (including abstention), a cheater knows he has a greater 
than 99,7% probability of being discovered. Supposing that after 3 
warnings a punishment is established, he would have a greater 
than 0,9973 probability of being punished. That’s a greater than 
99,1% probability of being punished, with a possible reward 
consisting on altering one single vote. 
We also have to recall that we established in stage 2 that every 
node would ask one single option to every node. It’s a very 
conservative requirement. We could make every node ask the 
other nodes for a v-ballot for every option and they would still not 
be able to determine what options the other nodes voted for. In 
this case, the probability for a cheater to pass the checks would 
always be less or equal than if there were only 2 options to vote. 
Therefore, in this case, p_cheat for 25 nodes and 3 options would 
be under 1,7E-4 and he would have an over 99,95% probability of 
being punished. 
4.2 Risk of cheat 1 with multiple attackers 
We have studied a case with only one dishonest node trying to 
alter the result. In case more than one node is dishonest in this 
way, there are two options: 
- They are independent attackers that will report any cheat 
from other nodes 
- They are attackers acting in coordination and they won’t 
report collisions from other attackers. 
In case they are independent attackers, the individual chances of 
success for every attacker are the same as in the studied case. But 
the probability that none of the dishonest nodes is detected it’s 
still lower, as the probability of being discovered is the sum of the 
probabilities for every cheating node. Being dn: number of 
dishonest nodes, the probability of cheating success is 𝑝_𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑛. 
So if p_cheat is 0,003 and there are 3 attackers, it’s now 2,7E-8. 
In case they are coordinated attackers, the new probability is 
𝑝(𝑐) =  𝑝(𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)(𝑛−𝑑𝑛)/𝑝 
Hence, in case k=1, p=25, o=3, where p_cheat was under 0,003; 
it’s now under 0,006 for every dishonest node if nd=3. But still 
they have to succeed all three nodes, so the new probability is 
under 0,006^3=2,1E-7. If nd=20, the new p_cheat is 0,31 and the 
probability that none of the 20 dishonest nodes is discovered is 
under 0,31^20=6,7E-11. 
4.3 Risk of cheat 1 with multiple attackers but 
only one active cheater 
There is also the possibility that only one of the dishonest nodes 
cheats and the rest of dishonest nodes only provide information to 
this node. They wouldn’t report collisions when a dishonest 
cooperator is involved. In that case, for k=1,p=25,o=3,nd=20, 
p_cheat would be under 0,31, and given that all other dishonest 
nodes will not cheat, the total probability of success will be under 
0,31. So if 20 dishonest coordinated nodes attack a cluster, they 
could alter one vote with an under 31% probability. The attacker 
would still have a greater than 69% probability to be discovered. 
If the same parameters are repeated for 3 consecutive votings, and 
3 warnings suppose a punishment, the dishonest node will have an 
over 32% chance of being punished, and therefore, an under 68% 
chance of success. As we will see next, even with this quite high 
success ratio, it’s very unlikely that any online voting will derive 
to such scenario where there are 20 coordinated cheaters for every 
25 voters. Even if this happens, two counter-measures will be 
exposed. 
4.3.1 Risk of attackers’ concentration 
Let’s see next what circumstances are needed so that an online 
voting derives to a situation where 20 out of 25 voters are 
coordinated cheaters. It could be that 20 out of 25 of the total 
number of voters were cheating coordinately and it could be that 
at a certain moment there were a high number of coordinated 
cheaters connected at the same time. Hence, supposing it’s an 
election with 22 million voters, a voting period of 12 hours, and 
an average of 4 minutes to vote, it would mean that at any 
moment there would be around 122,000 voters voting. To achieve 
a percentage of 20 out of 22 voters cheating coordinately, 500,000 
cheaters would need to be connected at the same minute 
coordinately. They would successfully alter around 16,924 votes, 
and around 7,964 attackers would be punished. Even if this 
unlikely scenario takes place, a counter-measure could simply 
consist of rewarding anyone reporting the attack. Attackers will 
need a way to coordinate their attack, and if only one person 
informs the authorities on the attack, all attackers could be 
identified and punished. In massive online elections with high 
interests in play, authorities would need to make an effort to 
identify these kind of attacks. In that case, the risk for attackers 
would be so high, and the reward so low (altering a small 
percentage of votes) that it would be a very unlikely attack. For 
small voting, where authorities can’t afford the expenses for 
detecting such coordinated attacks, and where it’s more likely that 
in some cases a high percentage of voters pretend to cheat, a 
counter-measure would be to vote in parallel with a centralized 
online voting method. At the end of the election you will have the 
result obtained by distributed voting and the result obtained by 
centralized voting. You are increasing the chances of being 
attacked under the centralized architecture, but this way you know 
that an attack to the central server or a coordinated attack by a 
massive number of voters in the distributed architecture will be in 
any case detected, the result will be discarded, and attackers will 
not get any reward. 
4.4 Risk of cheat 2 
Next, we will study probabilities for attacks of type CHEAT 2. 
Supposing we are in CASE 1 and node C is the cheater, he is 
receiving at the second round these v-ballots: 
N3,N4,N5,N7,N8,R2,R4,R5,R6,R7. The cheat would consist, for 
example, on replacing one of the v-ballots from one option for a 
v-ballot from another option. He could, in this example, select R4, 
and replace R5 for N2, making it seem like if the node who 
selected N2 selected R5 instead. Now node D gets the list of v-
ballots, he doesn’t detect any inconsistency, and he selects N5. 
Now Node A receives N2,N3,N4,N7,N8,R2,R6,R7 and he notes that 
N2 is in the list despite him selecting it. So the cheat fails. The 
only way it could have worked at this stage would be if Node D 
had selected N2. Let’s suppose it’s the case. Node A would 
receive: N3,N4,N5,N7,N8,R2,R6,R7. There is no inconsistency, so 
he will continue. He selects N8. Then Node B selects N3, Node C 
selects R2, and Node D selects R7. The final remaining v-ballots 
are: N4,N5,N7,R6. Apparently 3 nodes would have voted for R and 
one for N. Cheat 2 would succeed at this stage in this case. But 
then in stage 2 the probabilities of not being discovered would be 
the same as that in the case where the cheater selects 2 v-ballots 
from same option. It’s the same circumstance to be detected: two 
nodes selecting the same v-ballot. So, the same table applies and, 
in example, if we establish 25 nodes per cluster, and 3 available 
options to vote (including abstention), a cheater knows he has a 
probability greater than 99,7% of being discovered, and a 
probability higher than 99,1% for being punished if he tries again 
to cheat. The possible reward again would be altering only one 
vote. In case the cheater modifies more v-ballots from the list he 
receives, the probability of being discovered and punished would 
be still higher. Note that we didn’t explain how we would know 
which nodes should be warned for being possible cheaters. A new 
iterative algorithm will be used to detect the nodes candidates for 
cheating. For avoiding unnecessary complication and extension of 
this paper, we won’t explain this algorithm in that occasion. You 
can consider for simplicity that every node is warned and they 
aren’t connected again on the same cluster to avoid the possibility 
that the cheater node sweeps along the other nodes to a 
punishment. 
4.5 Risk of privacy violation 
We will study next the risk of a secret vote being violated. Let’s 
start supposing the voting has 3 available options; k is 1, cluster 
size is 15 nodes, and there are two malicious voters in the same 
cluster who want to cooperate to find out votes from other voters. 
One strategy to cooperate would be to share information from the 
verification stage of the algorithm. This way, they could find out 
that a node selected two v-ballots with different id’s 
corresponding to the same option. It would mean that this node 
voted for this option. In order to make this strategy work, they 
should ask every node for v-ballots from the same option. The 
option that every node asks to other nodes is determined by their 
ordered position in the list of nodes. This order is randomly 
established before starting the vote, so there is a probability 
p_nosame that they don’t ask for the same option. This probability 
p_nosame, if ao>=nt is 
𝑝_𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝑛𝑜,𝑛𝑡) = (𝑎𝑜 − 1)!(𝑎𝑜 − 𝑛𝑡)! 𝑎𝑜(𝑛𝑡−1)�  
, and if ao<nt it’s 
𝑝_𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑜,𝑛𝑡) = 0  
 
So, the probability that at least two nodes ask for the same option 
is p_same= 1 – p_nosame. In this case it would be 0,33 
Here we see a table with different values: 
Table 3 
#options (ao) #cheaters (nt) p_same 
3 2 0,33 
3 3 0,78 
5 2 0,2 
5 4 0,81 
5 6 1 
 
Therefore, if we organize an election with 3 available options, 
when 2 cheaters are in the same cluster, they have a 33% chance 
of finding out some votes; if there are 3 cheaters it’s a 78% 
chance, and if there are more than 3 cheaters it’s a 100%. 
Next we will calculate how many votes they could find out.  
We will call p_diffids(nt) to the probability that any node asked 
for an v-ballot by nt cheaters who ask the same option, respond 
with 2 different v-ballots (proving he voted that option). The 
formula to calculate it is: 
 
𝑝_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑠(𝑛𝑡) =  1 − 0,5(𝑛𝑡−1) 
 
We will call p_match(ao) to the probability that any node asked 
for a v-ballot corresponding to a specific option in stage 2, already 
voted for that option. We can’t know this probability but we will 
suppose that on average it is 1/ao. 
Hence, in a cluster where there are nt cheaters and ao options to 
vote, the probability for every node to reveal his vote to these nt 
cheaters would be:  
𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙(𝑎𝑜,𝑛𝑡) = 𝑝_𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑜,𝑛𝑡) × 𝑝_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑠(𝑛𝑡)×  𝑝_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ(𝑎𝑜) 
 
Table 4 
ao nt p_reveal(ao,nt) 
3 2 0,06 
3 3 0,19 
5 2 0,02 
5 4 0,14 
5 6 0,19 
 
Combining these two probabilities, we can make a table with the 
average number of votes expected to be discovered for different 
parameters.  
 #𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 = (#𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 − �#𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ �𝑛𝑡
𝑐𝑠
�� ∗
𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙2 ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
ao nt cs #attackers p_reveal #discovered 
3 2 15 1000 0,06 24 
3 3 15 1000 0,19 77 
3 4 15 1000 0,29 107 
5 2 35 1000 0,02 9 
5 3 35 1000 0,08 35 
5 4 35 1000 0,14 62 
5 5 35 1000 0,18 77 
5 6 35 1000 0,19 80 
 
This means that if an organized team of 1000 voters attack an 
election with 3 available options (ao=3), and 15 nodes per cluster, 
they could find out around 107 votes, and in case ao was 5 and 
cs=35, around 80 votes. This is a concern for a real voting but 
there is a way to avoid this risk. We will see it next. 
5. OVERALL ARCHITECTURE AND 
PROPERTIES OF THE VOTING SYSTEM 
We have found out that there is a security risk concerning the 
privacy of a vote. There is also a risk that nodes exposing their IP 
to other nodes suffer different DoS attacks or attempts of 
intrusion. To solve these problems we propose a distributed 
architecture, where nodes operate in clusters independently, but 
where they connect through intermediary nodes provided by an 
authority. These nodes will supervise voter legitimacy to vote, 
shallow IPs of voters, record warnings to users, apply 
punishments, and finally, shallow user ids offering temporal 
random ids to them during the voting. User-id-shallowing makes 
irrelevant the possibility that a group of attackers violate privacy 
from some nodes, given that they will know their shallowed id but 
not the real id. These intermediary nodes will transmit every 
message between nodes but they will not have access to the 
contents of these messages: every message will be encrypted with 
a public key that only the receiver can decrypt. The nodes will 
verify that intermediary nodes behave as expected, invalidating 
the voting if they detect any improper operation. 
Hence, the overall properties of the proposed voting architecture 
are: 
• If appropriate parameters are applied, the risk of altering 
votes for sporadic attackers is near zero, with very high 
risk of being punished for the attackers. 
• If appropriate counter-measures are implemented, even 
with a high percentage of voters being attackers, the 
probability that they succeed in the attack is near zero. 
• Risk of breaking the privacy of votes is zero if attackers 
only operate coordinately on clusters. 
• In case an attacker is able to get unauthorized access to the 
intermediary nodes, it will not alter any vote nor find out 
any vote. The only information stored by these nodes is 
the information that in the end will be made public to 
anyone who wants to download it. 
• In case an attacker is able to get unauthorized access to the 
intermediary nodes and operating coordinately with a 
number of non-honest nodes in different clusters, he could 
break the privacy of a number of voters numbered, if 
appropriate parameters are selected, not over 
approximately one-tenth of the number of coordinated 
attackers. In that case, they would know what these nodes 
voted for but they would not have any way at all to 
demonstrate it; so a public leaking of data would be 
useless, as this data could be falsified. 
• At the end of the election, the result of every cluster is 
published. Every result is signed by every voter. So, 
anybody can check that every voter signed only one result, 
and every voter can check that the result of his cluster is 
published. In case a result was not published, any voter in 
the cluster could resubmit the result. This result would be 
signed by every voter and the intermediary nodes that 
participated in the voting, proving that this is a valid result 
and has to be included in the counting. Anyone could also 
check that all signatures correspond to valid voters in the 
census. 
• The number of messages exchanged between nodes can 
grow linearly with the number of nodes: O(N), depending 
on some configuration parameters. It’s an advantage over 
other known MPC algorithms that usually have O(N^2). 
All messages between nodes should take no longer than 1 
second to be processed and transmitted, so you can have a 
timeout to avoid long waits. Long waits would be a way to 
enable DoS attacks. So our voting system is also reliable. 
• Dishonest users attempting to alter votes can be identified 
and punished; but we don’t expose in this paper the 
algorithm we employ to do it efficiently. 
There is still one kind of attack that could affect our voting system 
(and any other known online voting system). If a malware spreads 
through internet, being undetected, and including code to alter the 
voting client software, it, in theory, could make affected voters 
lose their privacy and the inviolability of their vote. There are 
many practical reasons why it’s quite unlikely that this kind of 
attack would succeed as the malware would need to spread fast 
and massively and stay undetected (speed and stealth are two 
contradictory requirements). But in case that happens, there is still 
one advantage for our system that would make it possible to 
detect the attack and invalidate the result. Given that you don’t 
have all votes randomly mixed, but only mixed in small sets, you 
could make a statistical analysis of the result, comparing a subset 
of the stored results with results obtained for these voters making 
use of an alternative voting system. If there is a statistically 
significant difference between the result obtained with our voting 
system and the partial results obtained with another system, 
anyone could appeal the result of the election. These votings with 
alternative systems could take place either after the election, or in 
parallel to the election. 
 
Finally, we can compare these risks with the risks associated to 
other voting systems.  
We know that centralized online voting systems often have high 
risks in relation to dishonest authorities and hacker attacks. Any 
of these attacks could usually cause the result to be totally altered 
and nobody ever knowing it. Also, every single vote could be 
disclosed. 
We also know that common voting systems based on paper ballots 
require very rigid protocols to minimize the risk of manipulation, 
which anyway can’t be totally granted for sure in any election. 
Observers usually consider a percentage of breaches in the 
protocol as acceptable; otherwise every election would need to be 
invalidated. 
 
Table 6 is a visualization of a comparison of risks. 
 
Table 6 
 Paper ballots  Centralized 
online voting  
Our distributed 
voting system 
Dishonest users           
Dishonest 
authorities  
         
Hacker attack           
   Low risk  
   Medium risk  
   High risk  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We propose a voting system with security advantages over other 
known voting systems. The focus is on minimizing risks instead 
of minimizing the probability of attack success, so even if an 
attack succeeds, the risk for the overall election is lower than in 
any other voting method. Even then, the probability of an attack to 
succeed is in most cases, near zero.  
It can be used in an online election as the only method for voting, 
or used in conjunction with a well-known centralized online 
voting technology, getting two results using totally independent 
voting systems, with different risks associated. If used in 
conjunction, you inherit the risks related to privacy from both the 
systems but you drastically reduce the risk of an undetected 
fraudulent result. Despite inheriting risks from both systems, these 
risks are not a serious concern compared with the risks associated 
to using only a centralized voting system. So, we propose the 
convenience of using this new distributed voting concept in 
conjunction with any well-established online voting technology 
whenever making use of an online voting technology. This extra 
security could strongly facilitate the extension of the use of online 
voting systems. 
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